Israeli Military Expert: Iran Received Loud Public Slap In The Face

• 2.08.2024, 10:46

Should we expect a big war in the Middle East?

In a few days, Israel eliminated a high-ranking Hezbollah military commander and head of its strategic unit, Fuad Shukr, and Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh. Why did Israel undertake such operations on the territory of other countries?

The Charter97.org website spoke about this with Israeli military expert David Sharp:

— Just yesterday, Israel finally confirmed the elimination of the commander of the Hamas military wing, Mohammed Deif, in Gaza, which took place a relatively long time ago. This operation may be one of the most significant not only in this war, but in many years in general. This operation is old, weeks have already passed, but there was no 100% confirmation that he was killed, and Hamas did not report it on principle.

It is important to understand the difference between what happened in Tehran and Beirut. Let's say these are slightly different stories. Let's start with Tehran, where the head of the Hamas Politburo was killed. Formally, he is the number one person in the organization. But informally, the main role is played by the head of Hamas in Gaza, although he is, one might say, lower in rank, but in practical matters he now plays a more important role. The foreign wing plays a more representative and supporting role.

After October 7, a decision was made at the political and military levels to eliminate everyone involved in the terrorist attack on Israel. First of all, these are the top figures of Hamas who are directly involved in the attack on October 7. This decision is absolutely fundamental and, I hope, irrevocable. It is of great importance in terms of preventing future terrorist attacks, as well as demonstrating strength and raising the morale of the population. This is a message to the enemy that those who carry out such things will not go unpunished. There are many more arguments that can be made here, but the important thing is that an absolutely clear and understandable decision has been made, which no one has canceled.

Ismail Haniyeh was eliminated as part of this decision. Although he was not in the military wing of Hamas, he was a man who repeatedly made decisions on terrorist attacks, on the strategy for fighting Israel, which meant the destruction of peaceful Israelis left and right. This man, as is commonly believed in the Israeli intelligence services, had “lived too long” a long time ago, as they say.

About 20 years ago, there was one famous assassination attempt, when they were afraid to use a bomb that was too heavy to attack the entire Hamas leadership in order to avoid civilian casualties. In the end, the entire leadership of the organization survived. By the way, Haniyeh was there.

It is completely logical that Haniyeh was one of the priority targets, so they decided to eliminate him at the first good opportunity. Until recently, he was mainly in Qatar, and Israel has an open-and-unspoken agreement with Qatar: not to touch Hamas militants on the territory of that country. Doha plays an important role as a mediator in the hostage exchange negotiations with Hamas.

Accordingly, unless Israel wants to sever all relations with Qatar, it cannot openly strike the country, although this may well change one day.

It is worth noting that Israel did not take responsibility for the elimination of Haniyeh, this is an important caveat, but I reason as if it were Israel. From this point of view, the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran, as they say, is a combination of “business and pleasure”. Iran is an enemy of Israel, waging a war against us: Iranian allies launch missiles at Israel, Iran itself has carried out strikes, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iranian intelligence organize terrorist attacks against Israelis around the world. There are no political reasons, as in the case of Qatar, not to eliminate the head of Hamas in Iran.

This is also an important message to Iran, that if we can get your dear guest in such a guarded and interesting place, then we can get you too. That is how I see this logic. Naturally, the elimination of the head of the Hamas politburo, who arrived for the inauguration of the Iranian president, hugged him a few hours before the liquidation, met with the spiritual leader, and so on, is a very loud and public slap in the face to Iran, which did not protect this most dear guest.

— Will Iran respond?

— Tehran will not be able to tolerate this. In all likelihood, Iran will strike Israel, it is quite possible that this will be an open attack with missiles or something like that. Iran's allies will join in, although they regularly strike Israeli territory anyway.

This risk was certainly taken into account. In my opinion, the elimination of the head of the Hamas politburo is such a fundamental moment that the risk was justified. Let's see how the parties behave in order to draw final conclusions.

As for the liquidation of Fuad Shukr, the situation is different. Let's say it happened within the framework of one war, but with different opponents and for different reasons. As you rightly said, he is the number one person in the military hierarchy of Hezbollah, although it is not entirely strict in the sense that he plays the role of commander-in-chief, to whom everyone obeys. I would say that he is the first among two or three equals, he is Hassan Nasrallah's closest adviser (the third Secretary General of Hezbollah — edit.) on strategic and military issues, a member of the “Jihad Council”, a narrow council that collectively decides on issues related to military and foreign policy affairs. So Fuad Shukr is a very important figure, an Iranian military adviser died in Beirut along with him, clearly an officer of no low rank. But the meaning here was different. Hezbollah is waging a limited war with Israel, in which the parties adhere to certain rules, established primarily for themselves, so as not to escalate into a major war. But these rules are expanded when there is an exchange of blows. Various excesses are possible.

To say that the Hezbollah strike that led to the death of 12 children and teenagers in Israel is some kind of excess is to say nothing. This is both a pretext and a reason not only for a serious strike, but also for starting a major war. However, Israel has not yet decided to start a major war, and it was decided to respond in a very painful way for Hezbollah.

The destruction of a commander of such rank is more than painful, here Hezbollah made a mistake. Perhaps they believed that Israel would not dare to strike Beirut, and Beirut is sacred to them, they always threatened Israel that “if you touch someone here or do something, you will face a severe response.”

Or they thought that Israel would not dare to respond, which is a gross mistake. He failed to avoid surveillance by Israeli intelligence, which knew where Shukr was, and then it was all a matter of technique — F-35 aircraft dropped a couple of precision bombs in the corner of the building where he was. The result is obvious.

So these are two different cases. In the situation with the leader of Hezbollah, decisions were made for one reason, with Haniyeh — for another. But the timing was a bit different.

— The main question that everyone is asking today: should we expect a big war in the Middle East? Or will we see a repeat of the exchange of blows between Iran and Israel that happened earlier?

— It is important to understand that a big war with Iran's participation and without its participation are different issues. If we consider a big war against Hezbollah without Iran's participation, then the possibilities are very great.

Firstly, Hezbollah is on its own. Yes, there is coordination of certain points with Iran, but it is independent.

It is worth assuming that Hezbollah will respond to Israel in a fairly powerful way, to put it mildly. And then, since Israel did not choose a major war on its own initiative, everything will depend on this response from Hezbollah. If something turns out to be painful or goes too far, then Israel's response to these actions will be appropriate. There is a good chance that, according to the “here we go”, this whole thing will turn into a major war. Or maybe not.

Everything will depend on the determination of the parties. On what gets where. I believe that Israel should, for strategic reasons, start a major war with Hezbollah. A large-scale operation is necessary to change the rules of the game, which are absolutely unacceptable for Israel strategically. However, this decision was either not made, or they decided to wait a few weeks to finish something in Gaza, to better prepare somewhere. This is also possible.

In any case, when they decided to eliminate Fuad Shukr in Beirut, they assumed that there was a chance of a major war with Hezbollah. Although they did not go for it deliberately, they did not rule out such an option, especially now, when there will most likely be a serious exchange of blows.

As for Iran, its involvement in a major war between Israel and Hezbollah is likely, but I would say that this probability is far from 100%. In this case, Iran will face serious military consequences from Israel, and problems with the United States are also possible.

An exchange of blows is quite possible, but the elimination of Haniyeh in Tehran changes something. If Iran strikes Israel with some limited one-time blow, the question is whether Israel will respond to this or not. Last time, when Iran struck Israel, demonstratively, though ineffectively, Israel responded with a very pinprick, not even taking responsibility, although it destroyed a key element of Iran's air defense.

This time, too, a lot will depend on Israel's response. Iran does not benefit from a major war with Israel, but we'll see. At the moment when such exchanges of blows occur, the chances of this increase, even when the opponents have no desire to actually start something bigger.

It is difficult to estimate this in percentages, but I would say that in the case of Hezbollah, the chance of a major war is quite high. This probability will remain for the next few weeks, somewhere until mid-autumn, even if everything calms down now.

And with Iran, as I already said, there is a connection to Hezbollah, there is wounded pride from what happened in Tehran. It is highly likely that a retaliatory strike is planned in the coming days, other actions by Iran against Israel are also possible, but this is more in the realm of classic terrorism. So the situation is tense.